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Online courts have the potential to create or exacerbate pressures to plead guilty, 
particularly for vulnerable defendants. I explore these pressures in the context of the 
Covid-19 pandemic in which increasing use of online justice has coincided with a 
significant increase in guilty pleas. 
 
In a 2018 article published in the Modern Law Review, Jill Peay and Elaine Player 
discussed the risks that incentivising guilty pleas can pose for defendants with 
vulnerabilities. They describe the potential differential impact of discounts awarded 
in accordance with the Sentencing Council’s Definitive Guideline on Reduction in 
Sentence for a Guilty Plea on defendants with vulnerabilities including learning 
disabilities, mental illness, personality disorder, and autism spectrum disorders. In 
this short piece, I argue that vulnerable defendants are also likely to be particularly 
susceptible to increased pressures to plead created by the use of online justice 
procedures. 
 
Existing research has linked online procedures (and in particular online appearances) 
to increased guilty plea rates, without identifying an underlying causal relationship. 
A 2010 Ministry of Justice paper examined outcomes in virtual magistrates courts 
over a 12-month pilot in London. In virtual courts, defendants appeared via a video 
link, while remaining in the police station in which they were charged. The study 
found that guilty pleas were three percentage points higher in the virtual courts than 
in the non-virtual courts (75% compared to 72%). A 2000 study examining the use 
of video link at Manchester Crown Court. In the 45 video link hearings which the 
study recorded, 24.4% of defendants pled guilty. The highest monthly plea rate in the 
same court during the five-month pilot period was 21.2%. The authors note that this 
comparison is even more striking since confirmed guilty pleas were removed from 
the video link list for the defendant to attend court in person.  
 
There are important theoretical reasons to believe that the relationship between online 
justice proceedings and plea rates may be causal and specifically that the use of online 
justice procedures increases pressure for defendants to plead guilty (see, for example, 
Jane Donoghue’s 2017 article in Modern Law Review). Research and theory from 
law and psychology, discussed below, suggests that such pressures have the potential 
to further exacerbate what Peay and Player describe as the ‘uneven burdens’ placed 
on vulnerable defendants by guilty plea procedure. 
 
Examining the potential for online justice to have a differential impact on vulnerable 
defendants plea decisions is important in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic in 
which increasing use of online justice has coincided with a significant increase in 
guilty pleas (the guilty plea rate in the Crown Court increased by 20% from 68% in 
Q2 of 2019 and 80% in Q2 of 2020). The Ministry of Justice has noted that it is likely 
that this increase is due to the restricted ability of courts to progress jury trials. 
However, and particularly given the existing work showing plea rates may be higher 
in online courts, the relationship between online justice and guilty plea rates must 
surely also be explored as a potential contributor to this increase. While some 
difficulties for vulnerable defendants appearing remotely have previously been 
recognised by the government, for example in the equalities statement linked to the 
Prisons and Court Bill (as reported here), many current pressures risk being 
overlooked as the result of large court backlogs and the dramatic and relatively 
sudden increase in online justice as a result of Covid-19.  
 
1. Online Justice and Informed Decision-Making. 
 
Guilty pleas constitute waivers of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). As a result, they are required to be 
made “in full knowledge of the facts, that is to say on the basis of informed 
consent…” Online procedures have the potential to compromise the knowledge, 
understanding, and appreciation of defendants, particularly where defendants have 
certain vulnerabilities.  
 
Research has shown that utilising online justice procedures can impact both levels 
and quality of representation. Research from pilot virtual courts suggests that those 
using virtual courts are more likely to self-represent (and note that self-representation 
rates have increased generally since this pilot court data was published, probably as 
a result of legal-aid cuts). As Donoghue notes, failing to receive legal advice has the 
potential to lead to increased guilty plea rates. First, few defendants are well-
equipped to represent themselves even in circumstances where they have a good case 
to make. Second, defendants who do not receive adequate legal advice may not 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of their case and may not know that they 
have a legitimate defence. Both of these factors have the potential to lead defendants 
to plead guilty even in situations in which they may not have actually committed an 
offence. Both of these factors are likely to differentially impact vulnerable 
defendants, particularly in the case of vulnerabilities influencing the ability to 
understand and process legal information. These defendants include those with 
comprehension and communication difficulties. In online courts, it may be hard to 
pick up these difficulties as a result of hampered communication – a 2017 survey 
reported that 71.79% of 198 legal professionals surveyed felt that in their experience 
appearing by video link had a negative impact on a defendant’s ability to 
communicate with practitioners and judges.    
 
Even where defendants are represented, research suggests that the quality of 
representation and the lawyer-client relationship is different where communications 
and court appearances take place online. In a study conducted in 2012 examining the 
experiences of 31 prisoners appearing in court via video-link in New South Wales, 
Australia, Caroline McKay described what she called a ‘nexus between space, 
participation, and comprehension’, and found that being in an isolating space such as 
a custody suite ruptures this relationship. Defendants in Mackay’s study reported 
things “sinking-in better” in a courtroom space, and described not understanding 
things and not having things explained to them sufficiently when appearing virtually. 
Another study conducted in Australia examined plea decisions made by defendants 
appearing remotely from a police station through interviews with judicial officers, 
court administrators, court staff, justice department officials, prosecutors, witnesses, 
and lawyers. This study found evidence of defendants who were appearing remotely 
in court receiving information and assistance from non-legally trained prison officers 
who were proximately close to them and easier to access then their lawyers. In the 
two virtual court pilots conducted in England and Wales, lawyers also noted 
difficulties communicating with clients via video-link, and a risk that these 
difficulties could hamper the provision of legal advice during a hearing (see here and 
here).  
 
These communication difficulties have the potential to undermine the status of 
defendants as informed decision-makers. These pressures are likely to be most 
important for defendants with vulnerabilities that hamper their communication or 
comprehension for two reasons. First, defendants with communication or 
comprehension difficulties may find it particularly hard to communicate with their 
lawyers online. Such clients may not necessarily have the ability or insight to know 
where they lack comprehension or to ask for more information, and lawyers may 
struggle to pick up on non-verbal cues indicating reduced understanding in an online 
environment. As Anne Poulin has noted, non-verbal cues are likely to be much harder 
to read where defendants appear remotely. Second, defendants with such 
vulnerabilities are likely to be the most reliant on their lawyers to assist with 
comprehension, communication, and legal decision-making. As a result, these 
defendants are more susceptible to misunderstanding and confusion, and entering 
guilty pleas as a result.  
 
In addition, defendants with certain vulnerabilities may struggle to engage with the 
online process regardless of their representation. As a result, they may lack an 
understanding of their case and the implications of pleading guilty, both as a result 
of online communications with legal representatives and online appearances in court. 
One example of a group of defendants who are likely to struggle with this difficulty 
is defendants with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs). In a 2017 report by 
Transform Justice, autism expert Dr. Marie Tidball reported that defendants with 
ASDs can struggle to associate a video link as being part of their case and thus to 
understand the significance of what happens in court and what is being said in court. 
The 2017 report describes the experience of one mother who was watching her 
autistic son on a video screen, and remarked: ‘Look at him, he’s not listening. I know 
he doesn’t know what’s going on.’  
 
For these reasons, defendants with ASDs may struggle to engage with what is 
happening in court and to understand and appreciate information being given to them. 
As a result, they may not fully understand the case against them or appreciate the 
consequences of entering a guilty plea. These defendants cannot be said to have given 
informed consent to waive their right to a fair trial.  
 
2. Online Justice, Autonomy, and Free Decision-Making 
 
The autonomy and free decision-making of defendants has the potential to be 
compromised where they appear from custody (or to a lesser extent from the police 
station) rather than court. 
 
First, where defendants who are incarcerated make plea decisions from custody, their 
autonomy has the potential to be undermined. This undermining occurs where a 
defendant feels sufficient distress as a result of the custodial environment that they 
cannot engage with the plea decision-making process. Where defendants feel 
depressed or distressed or lack motivation in decision-making, this has the potential 
to significantly impair their ability to make autonomous decisions in accordance with 
their underlying values and preferences. Without motivation to engage in a decision-
making process, an agent can feel deprived of the sense that there is a point to the 
decision that they are making and as a result fail to engage in or to reflect on the 
decision appropriately (see here and here, for example). This type of disengagement 
can lead to decisions that do not accord with underlying values, for example through 
pleading guilty when innocent just to ‘get the process over with.’ While a definition 
of autonomy that encompasses this type of vulnerability is likely to be beyond the 
scope of the current definition used by the ECtHR (see Natsvlishvili v Georgia, 
paragraph 97), the fact that vulnerable defendants may be disproportionately 
susceptible to autonomy depletion and subsequent guilty pleas that are detached from 
underlying values and preferences is important from an equality perspective.  
 
The remand environment can be particularly distressing and difficult for vulnerable 
defendants who may struggle to cope in such an environment. They are therefore 
likely to be particularly susceptible to the influence of what has been termed the 
“coercive environment” of incarceration (although note that existing research focuses 
on those serving sentences in prison rather than those on remand). For example, 
research investigating the experiences of inmates with ASDs has shown that they are 
at an increased risk of bullying, confrontations, exploitation, anxiety, and social 
isolation in custody. Research with inmates with intellectual disabilities also suggests 
that such inmates may be disproportionately susceptible to the harm resulting from 
being detained in custody. For example, one study found higher levels of probable 
psychosis in inmates with intellectual disabilities when compared to controls. The 
authors of this study note that although this disproportionate rate of psychosis may 
pre-exist imprisonment, there may also be a disproportionate onset of psychosis 
during incarceration in those with intellectual disabilities as prisoners are ‘challenged 
by the stressful and complex prison environment.’ In contrast, although not ideal, the 
courtroom  provides an environment in which a defendant can be supported by 
physically-present family and friends and legal representatives, all of which can 
foster a sense of support and motivation (note that in online appearances, defendants 
may be unable to see family and friends even where family and friends are able to 
attend court in person due to the orientation of the camera, see here and here). 
 
There is an additional reason to believe that appearing in court from custody might 
disproportionately cause vulnerable defendants to plead guilty, grounded in 
psychological theory. Appearances from custody may have a cognitively biasing 
impact on defendant decision-making through influencing the “framing” of guilty 
plea decisions. Framing refers to a bias demonstrated in cognitive psychology, where 
decision-makers who are asked to pick between a sure option (such as a guilty plea, 
where there is a 100% chance of an outcome) and risky option (such as trial, where 
there is a chance of a worse outcome and a chance of a better outcome) have a 
tendency to pick the sure option when a decision is framed as a gain, and the risky 
option when the same decision is framed as a loss. For theoretical explanations of 
this effect see here and here. Research specifically examining framing in guilty plea 
decision-making in the United States plea-bargaining context suggests that 
defendants can be susceptible to this effect when deciding whether to plead guilty. 
 
Framing has the potential to be important when considering guilty pleas and online 
justice. For defendants remanded in custody, whether they are kept in custody for 
their court appearance or whether they are allowed out of custody to appear in court 
may influence their cognitive framing of decision options. Where defendants are able 
to attend court, they get to experience the outside world again (albeit on a limited 
basis). This experience of the outside world can emphasise the status of custody and 
a custodial sentence as a loss of freedom and thus make the imposition of any 
custodial sentence at trial or via plea (as would most often be imposed on a defendant 
who has been held on remand and is then convicted) appear as more of a loss. On the 
other hand, where defendants are not able to leave custody, they are more likely to 
view incarceration as a baseline and thus eventual freedom (following a plea or trial 
sentence) as a gain. Thus, defendants appearing from custody are likely to be in more 
of a gain frame, while defendants appearing in person are likely to be in more of a 
loss frame. As a result of the standard framing effect, we would therefore expect 
defendants appearing from custody to be more biased towards the sure option (plea) 
and defendants appearing in person to be more biased towards the risky option (trial). 
Although this effect has not been examined previously in the context of online justice, 
it has been discussed when considering how remand in custody might influence the 
framing of decision options (see here). Since the defendant’s decision-making in such 
scenarios is biased by a restrictive situation that they have been placed in by the state, 
this effect can be seen as an unintentional manipulation of free choice (particularly 
in a system where the defendant is innocent until proven guilty and thus the baseline 
position of the defendant should be freedom).  This effect is particularly important in 
the context of the Covid-19 pandemic in which the number of defendants held on 
remand awaiting trial has been reported to have increased by almost a third as a result 
of court delays.  
 
Again, this effect is unlikely to rise to the level of restriction on free choice necessary 
to invalidate the waiver of fair trial rights under Article 6 of the ECHR, but it may 
have equality implications. These implications arise because the likelihood that the 
effect is present in decision-making will be related to the way that a defendant 
mentally frames their own situation which can be impacted by vulnerability. For 
example, a defendant who becomes depressed and unmotivated in custody will be 
more likely to start to feel helpless and view custody as their status quo, thus placing 
them in a gain frame (biasing them towards pleading guilty) when appearing from 
custody. These defendants may be particularly in need of moving from custody to the 
more ‘dignified’ courtroom environment. Therefore, where vulnerabilities cause 
particular difficulties with the remand environment, they may also have the potential 
to increase framing effects and thus guilty pleas in those appearing from custody. 
Research in cognitive psychology finds that those with one potential vulnerability, 
ASDs, tend to be less susceptible to framing effects. However, another vulnerability, 





There are important potential benefits of online justice, particularly in the context of 
current court backlogs. Dealing with cases online may also have the potential to 
reduce discrepancies in time and cost of a full trial compared to time and cost 
involved in pleading guilty, and thus may actually make trial more accessible for 
some defendants (for a discussion of the increased time and cost currently involved 
in trial when compared to pleading guilty, see here). However, research from as far 
back as the 1980s shows that defendant decisions have the potential to be influenced 
by the move towards online justice. Any influence on decision-making is problematic 
where it influences decisions in normatively undesirable ways (for example by 
undermining defendant understanding or autonomy) or where it differentially and 
adversely impacts vulnerable defendants. The research discussed here suggests that 
the move towards online justice has the potential to do both, particularly in the 
context of guilty pleas. Where a defendant is convicted on the basis of a guilty plea 
rather than at a full trial, they essentially decide to self-incriminate, and the 
prosecution is no longer required to prove the case against them. In this context, the 
legitimacy and fairness of convictions becomes dependent on the decision-making of 
defendants. It is therefore vital to ensure that this decision-making is free and 
informed, and that procedures surrounding decisions do not exacerbate inequality 
resulting from vulnerability. Such decisions should be closely monitored to protect 
the integrity of the criminal justice process and to ensure compliance with Equality 
Act 2010 obligations. Empirical research on online procedures must specifically 
address the relationships between vulnerability, guilty pleas, and online procedures 
for this reason. This research is particularly important as policy-makers begin to plan 
for the future of online justice, and seek to retain the potential benefits of online 
procedures, beyond the Covid-19 pandemic.   
 
